ILLEGAL PUSHBACKS AND BORDER VIOLENCE REPORTS

OCTOBER 2022
BALKAN REGION
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

4 Executive Summary

5 General
   5 Reporting network
   5 Methodology
   5 Terminology
   5 Abbreviations

6 Trends in Border Violence
   6 Increase of violence in pushbacks from Romania to Serbia

7 Update on the Situation
   7 Croatia
      7 Solidarity initiatives in Rijeka
      8 The 7 days paper
   9 Serbia
      9 Police violence against NNK team in Sid
      10 Change in visa regime for Tunisia and Burundi
      11 Eviction at Srpski Krstur

11 Greece
   11 Shipwrecks and incidents of violence
   12 Key reports released

13 Turkey
   13 General Updates
   14 Lack of protection for Syrian refugees in the country
   14 Tensions between Turkey and Greece

15 Italy
   15 Trieste

16 Glossary of Reports, October 2022

18 Network Structure and Contact
In October, the Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN) shared 35 testimonies of pushbacks impacting 550 people-on-the-move (POM) across the Balkans and Greece. This report brings together first-hand testimonies from a range of countries in the region to look at the way European Union states and other actors are affecting systemic violence towards people crossing borders.

This month, the BVMN observed an increase in the violence of the pushbacks perpetrated by Romanian police officers at the Serbian–Romanian border. This route, which has become more popular in the past two years, is used by many POM attempting to reach Hungary through Romania crossing the so-called “triangle” area, where the Romanian, Hungarian and Serbian borders unite. Meanwhile, families, unaccompanied minors and single–men remain stuck at the border between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The rest of this report focuses on updates from the field, starting with the new situation in Rijeka (Croatia), where a spike in arrivals has been met with acts of solidarity from the local community, and following with the current situation in Northern Serbia where high numbers of POM are stuck at the Romanian and Hungarian borders, attempting to cross the border in large groups. The issue of criminalisation of solidarity remains a relevant topic in this new report, which describes the incident of police violence and harassment directed towards the No Name Kitchen team in Sid.

Due to pressure from EU institutions, the Serbian government has announced the end of the visa–free regime for Burundi and Tunisia citizens. This development comes amidst an increase in the number and mediatisation of evictions of POM in Northern Serbia, an example being the one carried out by the authorities in Srpski Krstur last month.

This report also covers updates regarding developments in Greece and Turkey, where two shipwrecks taking place on the same day have left 23 people dead and several missing. The hostilities between both countries and the lack of protection for Syrian refugees and asylum-seekers in the region are also expanded upon in this piece, which looks at the increased instrumentalisation of POM by the governments in the tensions between each other, as well as to the further securitisation of the Turkish border with Iran. Key findings in recent reports on human rights violations in Greece, including the OLAF report on Frontex involvement in pushbacks in the country, are also included. Lastly, members in Trieste share updates regarding the high number of unaccompanied minors arriving in the city, and the lack of facilities available to receive asylum-seekers.

---

1 BVMN is a network of watchdog organisations active in the Balkans, Greece and Turkey including No Name Kitchen, Rigardu, Are You Syrious, Mobile Info Team, Josoor, InfoKolpa, Centre for Peace Studies, Mare Liberum, Collective Aid, Blindspots and Pushback Alarmphone Austria
**GENERAL**

**REPORTING NETWORK**

BVMN is a collaborative project between multiple grassroots organisations and NGOs working along the Western Balkan Route and Greece, documenting violations at borders directed towards people-on-the-move. The partners have a common website database, used as a platform to collate testimonies of illegal pushbacks which are gathered through interviews.

**METHODOLOGY**

The methodological process for these interviews leverages the close social contact that we have as independent volunteers with refugees and migrants to monitor pushbacks at multiple borders. When individuals return with significant injuries or stories of abuse, one of our violence reporting volunteers will sit down with them to collect their testimony. Although the testimony collection itself is typically with a group no larger than five persons, the pushback groups which they represent can exceed 50 persons. We have a standardised framework for our interview structure which blends the collection of hard data (dates, geo-locations, officer descriptions, photos of injuries/medical reports, etc.) with open narratives of the abuse.

**TERMINOLOGY**

The term pushback is a key component of the situation that unfolded along the EU borders (Hungary and Croatia) with Serbia in 2016, after the closure of the Balkan Route. Pushback describes the informal expulsion (without due process) of an individual or group to another country. This lies in contrast to the term “deportation”, which is conducted in a legal framework. Pushbacks have become an important, if unofficial, part of the migration regime of EU countries and elsewhere.

**ABBREVIATIONS**

BiH – Bosnia and Herzegovina  
HRV – Croatia  
SRB – Serbia  
SLO – Slovenia  
ROM – Romania  
HUN – Hungary  
AUT – Austria  
MNK – North Macedonia  
GRC – Greece  
BGR – Bulgaria  
TUR – Turkey  
EU – European Union
Though most of the POM waiting in northern Serbia are still trying to cross the border directly to Hungary, some of them are now taking a different route and attempting to reach this country by passing through Romania, in order to avoid the 4-metres double fence that divides Hungary and Serbia. The testimonies of POMs in the region, mostly collected from Syrians, describe striking accounts of violence along the Romanian border. According to reports collected by BVMN members on the field, intense physical violence, forced undressing, humiliating language, theft of personal belongings, and the use of batons, dogs, and guns seem to be common practices at the Romanian border, similar to Hungarian border violence practices.

These testimonies suggest that the amount of units and officers deployed at this border is lower than in Hungary. However, the motivation to take money and belongings from POM seems to be a common and important factor in the modus operandi of the border security personnel. Specifically, one of the most prevalent complaints this month among POM in contact with member organisations of BVMN concerned a single police officer, who is reportedly well known to POMs and whose physical characteristics were described in great details, taking people to an out-of-sight location, forcing them to undress and taking their money.

Moreover, POM mentioned that instead of destroying their phones, Romanian officers would enter a code in the settings to make the phone traceable in case of future use. Though this information cannot be confirmed at the moment. POM have claimed that, when using the "hacked" phone again on Romanian territory, some kind of signal is sent to the authorities, so their location is immediately known to them. BVMN members were also informed that specially trained dogs are often used in pushbacks in this area. These dogs are said to be trained to encircle groups of people and push them towards the border.

Lastly, some POM have also reported that upon apprehension by Romanian authorities, they were told things like: “I saw you walking two hours ago”. It seems that, even when the officers locate POM already at the beginning of their path, they might wait to apprehend them at a further time when they are exhausted from the walk. Use of GPS and maps is of crucial importance for people trying to cross Romania. Aware of this, Romanian border officials have been reported to first look at the route people have marked on the map when they stop them, thus reducing the likelihood of success for people who will take a similar route.
This month, some activists from Trieste went to Rijeka and Istra to meet and support local initiatives around the Rijeka train station, where several people with the so-called 7 days paper (an expulsion order to leave the country and the European Union in that period of time) were in need of medical support and rest before continuing their journey. The local municipality seems to be committed to finding a partial humanitarian solution, by establishing containers with showers, toilets, medical support and a meal per day, in collaboration with the local Red Cross. The presence of groups of men and families was also observed in smaller towns like Pazin and Lupoglav, as the 7 days paper effectively allows people to move freely in the territory for a week. However, changes to this policy are expected once Croatia joins the Schengen area.
The so-called 7-days paper was first documented as a new practice of the Croatian authorities earlier this year. In February, BVMN reported about this new form of expulsion of POM from the country. Since then, the situation has not changed in this regard. It represents an expulsion obligation, which must be fulfilled within 7 days upon receiving the document. It allegedly states that the person must leave not only the territory of Croatia, but that of the entire EU. By doing so, the Croatian authorities aim to prevent POM from applying for asylum in any other EU member state upon re-entry. However, the issuance of this expulsion or return decision cannot legally constitute grounds for expulsion or return from another EU Member State.

According to BVMN members’ observations, the 7-days papers are issued to people randomly. There seems to be no pattern under which Croatian border guards decide to issue this, which suggests that it is at the discretion of them individually. There is a possibility that families are predominantly let through, while single men are still violently pushed back. Some nationalities might also be given preference over others in the selection of entry.

In December 2021, the Council of the EU confirmed that Croatia met all the requirements to access full Schengen membership. Nearly a year later, on November 10th, 2022, the removal of internal border controls between Croatia and the Schengen area was approved. However, the Council must still come to agree upon a final decision and the logistics of the transition. The exact effects that this change will have for the POM in the region are not foreseeable yet.

Meanwhile, in contrast to the solidarity initiatives in Rijeka, an increase of POM gathering around the train station in Zagreb has been met with a higher police presence patrolling the area. On October 25th, police authorities arrested about 20 POM and moved others from Zagreb to Sesvete, a town 11 km away from the capital.
In October, four members of the No Name Kitchen team in Sid were subjected to police harassment and intimidation during an incident taking place near Batrovci, Serbia. Around 3pm, the team was approached by two police officers in a police car while parked on a road near the town. All of the members in the car were asked to show their identity documents and white cards, as well as the car papers.

The authorities told the team that one of the car papers had a missing stamp and proceeded to check the vehicle and their personal belongings thoroughly without further explanations. Moreover, they checked on the internet the names of some of the medication and antibiotic pills they found in one of the bags.

After that, the officers called one of their colleagues on the phone, who spoke to a member of the NNK team in English and told them they had to go to the police station, refusing to explain the reason behind it. Two people were forced to go in the police car to the police station, while the other two drove the NNK car with one of the officers inside of it. The station was located at the border with Croatia. One of the members of the team asked to have their backpack back but the request was denied. During the ride in the police car, there were two rifles pointing at the volunteers. They asked the police to stop pointing the weapons at them. After an initial refusal, the police agreed to do so.

At the police station, the request of two of the volunteers to use the toilet was denied, and the team was also told that they could not use their phones.

While waiting for the team’s local representative to arrive, one of the policemen was describing the organisation’s house in Sid with a lot of detail, presumably in order to show he knew exactly where the team lived. After making the volunteers take everything out of the car, the officers thoroughly search the vehicle with flashlights, cameras and scanners, inside and under the car. They also checked, one by one, the team members’ personal belongings, including some of their phones and notebooks.

After that, the team was brought to the police office inside the border area, where they were told that they had to undergo an individual control, the reasons or details of which were not explained. One of them was then taken to a private room with two women officers and was forced to undress completely in front of them. They forced her to undress slowly, one piece of clothing at a time, while taking the time to check every piece (pockets, shoes, etc.). Once she was completely nude, they asked her some questions: address of the house in Sid, the length of her stay, her country of origin, etc. They spoke in Serbian among themselves and the volunteer recognised the word "migrants". After checking each piece of cloth, they tossed them to the floor. She was then forced to squat while the two police officers were watching, standing in front of her. The other members of the team were subjected to a similar inspection after this, before the team was allowed to leave the station.
Without the possibility of asking for asylum. Some of the reports described people being pushed back to previous transit countries and, at least in one case, the person was eventually returned to their country of origin without due process. This constitutes a violation of the principle of non-refoulement, which obliges Serbia to stop returns of people to places where they might face death or torture.

This change, motivated by the pressures imposed by the European Union's migration agenda, further shrinks the available safe pathways for people to access protection in the continent and thus continues to push people to take dangerous routes where instances of violence, deprivation and inhumane treatment are constantly being reported.

In October, Serbia's government notified the Tunisian and Burundian embassies in Belgrade of the end of the visa-free regime that currently applies to the citizens of both countries. This change will be implemented at the end of this month and comes amid pressures from the EU on Serbia to make its migration policy more strict, under the allegations that the country is responsible for the increase in the number of POM entering the bloc —the first 9 months of 2022 saw three times more crossings than the same period of 2021. The announcement comes at the same time that some EU countries pledge to support Serbia in fortifying its border with North Macedonia, seemingly in exchange for Serbia's adherence to this demand. Though the details on the extent and type of support are still unclear, it has been confirmed that it will include an increase in the number of foreign officers deployed on the Serbian-Macedonian border.

While the close relationship between the Tunisian and Serbian governments is a legacy of Yugoslavian times, the visa-free regime for Burundian citizens was implemented in May 2018, when Burundi withdrew their recognition of Kosovo. Since then, Serbia has become the only country in Europe where people from Burundi could travel without a visa. After that, in 2021, Burundians became the third largest group of asylum-seekers in Serbia.

However, despite the current policy, members of BVMN and other organisations on the ground have collected testimonies with nationals of Tunisia and Burundi, as well as of Cuba, who were held in incommunicado detention at the Belgrade airport—often for several days—before being pushed back,
EVICTION AT SRPSKI KRSTUR

On October 5th, the Serbian operational strike group and members of the Gendarmerie conducted a large-scale eviction of an informal settlement for more than 200 people-on-the-move in Srpski Krstur, a village in Northern Serbia close to the Hungary and Romania borders. While most of those evicted were simply looking to seek asylum in EU member states, the Serbian government and media continue to criminalise and dehumanise these individuals through the coverage of this eviction. The Serbian Minister of International Affairs, Aleksandar Vulin, stated that the primary objective for this operation is “to prevent smuggling of irregular migrants to Hungary and suppress the smuggling of weapons and narcotics”, occupants of the informal settlement were described as “criminals and scum.”

In this event, more than 200 POM were forcefully taken to Serbian official camps. Some of those were taken to prosecutors offices and detention centres in Dimitrovgrad, a municipality near the Serbia–Bulgaria border, where individuals had their belongings and money confiscated, restricted access to the internet and communication devices (i.e., only one hour twice a week to the internet), and limited opportunities to obtain legal representation (i.e., only two weeks after detention).

Ultimately, the Serbian government is facing increasing pressure from the European Union to control the number of people entering and passing through the country in hopes of crossing into EU member states such as Croatia and Hungary. In addition to ending the bilateral visa liberation agreements with Burundi and Tunisia, Serbian authorities have increased evictions across informal settlements in the country and facilitated heavy media coverage during these operations in an attempt to stricten state enforcement against migration and further criminalise POM.

GREECE

SHIPWRECKS AND INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE

Sea crossings through the Aegean from Turkey to Greece have increased by 150 percent since last year. Two consecutive events on October 5th briefly made international headlines, when two separate shipwrecks carrying POM across the Aegean Sea led to at least 23 deaths and many still missing. The first boat, carrying about 40 people, mostly of African descent including women and children, capsized off the east coast of Lesbos, resulting in 18 deaths. The second sea vessel carrying 95 people from Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran – including 18 children – crashed into rocks on the west coast of Kythira. Only 7 bodies were recovered and 8 are still missing. The boat set sail two days prior for Italy from Turkey. The incident sparked debate in the media over the reasons for the rise in numbers of refugees and asylum seekers undergoing dangerous sea crossings. The Greek authorities claim human traffickers are forcing people over in
boats for quick money despite bad weather, while local journalists and NGOs claim it is an act done out of desperation and fear of violent pushbacks being committed by the Greek State.

On October 20th, Doctors Without Borders/Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) provided psychological and medical care to 22 distressed migrants and asylum seekers after responding to an alert for emergency assistance. Four members of the group had injuries sustained from reported beatings, while another three had been tightly handcuffed with plastic zip ties. The injuries were reportedly perpetuated by 7 or 8 persons impersonating doctors offering food and assistance who had left the scene prior to MSF’s arrival. MSF reported similar incidences of violence in the area of late.

**KEY REPORTS RELEASED**

Multiple significant updates for Greek asylum and border issues have emerged over the past month. First off, the IOM’s ongoing Missing Migrants Project released updated figures documenting over 5,684 deaths on migration routes to and within Europe since the beginning of 2021. 126 of those deaths have been at the Turkey-Greece land border, a significant rise in comparison to previous years, which highlights the trend of increased violence at Greek borders recorded by BVMN. Notably, IOM reports that almost half the deaths at the Turkey-Greece land border – 58 recorded cases – have been related to pushbacks despite continued denial of the practice by Greek authorities.

Based on extensive research, Human Rights Watch have reported that hundreds of Syrian refugees have been arrested and deported to Syria in the first half of 2022. Detainees were subject to inhumane treatment and forced to sign voluntary removal agreements by Turkish officials. As a result, HRW has urged the EU and member states to acknowledge that Turkey does not meet the criteria as a safe third country for refugees. They have specifically called on Greece to repeal the Joint Ministerial Decision deeming Turkey a safe third country, and encouraged the EU Commission to take legal action if Greece fails to repeal the Decision.

Finally, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) report exposing Frontex’ complicity in Greek pushbacks was published in full this month. The report confirms the Greek practice of pushbacks in the Aegean Sea using flimsy liferafts and details multiple Frontex actions which facilitated pushbacks – from withholding cases of rights violations from its fundamental rights officer to suspending aerial surveillance during pushback operations to cover up breaches of law. Despite the overwhelming evidence, Frontex is yet to terminate its joint operations with Greek border authorities.
Amidst a deepening economic crisis and near-double increase in cost of living in the past year, xenophobia in Turkey continues to rise. With critical elections scheduled for June 2023 — and with migrants and refugees increasingly depicted as the source of most of the country’s problems — the AKP government continues to push through more restrictive migration controls. This trend has continued over the past years as Turkish citizens seek to migrate to Europe and North America in search of better life prospects. However, the rejection rate of Turkish citizens applying for Schengen Visas sharply increased by 16.5 percent in the past year. Among other routes to North America, the past year has also seen a sharp rise in the number of Turkish citizens attempting to cross the Mexican-US border, as is briefly mentioned in this report.

Furthermore, there has been a high number of people leaving from Russia and Ukraine and settling in or passing through Turkey in the wake of Russian’s invasion and subsequent mobilisation draft in September. A September report by France24 placed the number of Russian citizens seeking residency in Turkey this year at 50,000, while 3 million had entered the country as tourists so far this year.

In terms of the main developments in migration controls and regulation, on October 22nd, Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu stated that Turkey had "installed 1,055 kilometres of border wall and security roads, 918 kilometres of border lighting, 284 kilometres of thermal cameras. We have also completed 230 electro-optical towers, which can see around 10 kilometres, to 40 kilometres." Soylu, referring to Directorate of Migration statistics, was talking about the Turkish south-eastern border with Iran, where allegedly over 200,000 people have been prevented from irregular crossing so far this year. Soylu stressed that Turkey continues to increase deportations, up to 97,448 people so far this year, according to the Directorate. Additionally, many of those held in detention centres are denied access to information in a language they understand. On top of this figure, it is claimed that 50,000 people from Syria ‘voluntarily’ returned so far this year. President Erdoğan has publicly committed to the ‘voluntary return’ of over a million Syrians in the next year to the supposed safe zones in Idlib, largely controlled by the Turkish military and, amongst other risks, still a target of regular shelling from Bashar al-Assad ally, Russia. A report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) declares that between February and July 2022, “Turkish authorities arbitrarily arrested, detained, and deported hundreds of Syrian refugee men and boys to Syria,” an explicit violation of the non-refoulement principle.
**Lack of Protection for Syrian Refugees in the Country**

According to the [2022 Turkey Report](https://cfr.org/report/turkey-refugees-migration), published in October by the European Commission, Turkey no longer grants people from Syria automatic temporary protection status, instead placing new arrivals in camps. Meanwhile, “over 600,000 people have had their protection status deactivated on the sole ground of residing in a place other than their declared address, without any assessment of their needs for protection.” The status of temporary protection — which is far more easily revoked, as is happening now en masse — is the closest to refugee status that Syrian people in Turkey have been granted, due to Turkey’s specific adoption of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, which only recognises European nationals as refugees. Registrations of applications for both international and temporary protection have also been officially halted in a number of regions on the basis of the country’s recent “25% rule”, which aims to limit the quota of foreigners living in each province. For many who are registered in Turkey, the new 25% rule itself may not signify a dramatic difference in their circumstances, as regional restrictions have been part of the conditions of temporary protection and the third-country resettlement process for years.

The above-mentioned violations testify again that, contrary to its designation by the EU and its member states, Turkey cannot be regarded as a Third Safe Country according to the purported standards of international law.

---

**Tensions between Turkey and Greece**

Hostilities between Turkey and Greece have also [continued to escalate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hostilities_between_Turkey_and_Greece) over the past few months, with migrants and refugees being routinely instrumentalised by both states in this process. That is to say, Greece accuses Turkey of actively sending migrants over its borders as a means of undermining Greek security, while Turkey denies this but regularly makes open threats to do so. Again, it is crucial to stress that it is the border regime of Fortress Europe as a whole that underlies how POM become pawns in this struggle between the two states, and it cannot be reduced to simply an issue between Turkey and Greece.

This unstable dynamic between the two states managed to reach graphic new heights in mid-October, as [92 POM were reportedly found naked](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/21/92-pom-were-reportedly-found-naked-on-the-greek-side-of-the-evros-river) on the Greek side of the Evros River dividing the two countries. Greece’s migration minister, Notis Matarachi, who shared a photograph on Twitter purportedly from the scene, alleged that members of the group testified to Greek police and Frontex that they were forced naked into dinghies by Turkish authorities and made to cross the river to the Greek side. Turkey dismissed the claims, describing them as “fake news” and citing numerous examples of POM being subject to all manner of pushbacks and other violence from Greece over the last number of years.

This October also saw the culmination of the Caravan of Light convoy of around 600 people almost reaching the Turkey-Greece land border. The convoy — consisting mainly of women, men and children of Syrian origin, but also joined by people of other nationalities — was organised initially...
through Syrian activists fed up with the discrimination and violence they face in Turkey, resulting in a callout to attempt an open mass crossing of the Turkish–Greek land border, appealing for international humanitarian support to do so. Footage emerged on October 19th of what appears to be Turkish officers restraining and beating members of the group, denying them access to the Greek border. By this time, roughly 80,000 people had joined the main Telegram group through which the action was being coordinated and documented. Greece responded to the development of the convoy by framing it as a provocation orchestrated by the Turkish state, which Turkey in turn has outright denied.

In October 2022, collectives operating in Piazza Libertá (Trieste) witnessed a high number of arrivals of unaccompanied minors, up to 304 in the square, a similar number to the one reported in the previous month. This trend includes the arrivals of unaccompanied children as young as 11–13 years old, which constitutes a worrisome pattern, especially taking into account the lack of sufficient services available to POM arriving in the city.

Most POM reaching Trieste seek to continue their journey and not be identified in the city, but some of them try to apply for asylum upon arrival in Italy. While those who choose this option have the right to be accommodated in the reception centers, they are currently left in the streets due to the overcrowded camps and the lack of enough transfers to other Italian regions. Thus, during the month of October, around 250 people were forced to sleep in the streets for longer than a month. The lack of a state response to these needs is met with the efforts of volunteers and associations operating around the area, who try to support POM with showers at the Daily Centre and medical cures in the square.

The municipality announced plans to open a dormitory with 90 places which could partially solve this problem. However, at the moment, it seems like these promises are not being followed with actual realisations. The collectives in the region fear that the change of national government in the country might bring the restart of pushbacks at the Italian–Slovenian border, adding to the ongoing human rights violations currently happening along the Balkan Route.
### GLOSSARY OF REPORTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Link</th>
<th>Incident Date</th>
<th>Recorded Date</th>
<th>Demographic</th>
<th>Group Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romania to Serbia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>30th September</td>
<td>2nd October</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2nd October</td>
<td>10th October</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>18th October</td>
<td>20th October</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>14th October</td>
<td>20th October</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>14th October</td>
<td>20th October</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>15th October</td>
<td>16th October</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungry to Serbia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>30th September</td>
<td>13th September</td>
<td>Morocco, Tunisia</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1st October</td>
<td>10th October</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1st October</td>
<td>3rd October</td>
<td>Afghanistan, India</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1st October</td>
<td>3rd October</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4th October</td>
<td>11th October</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4th October</td>
<td>11th October</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>7th October</td>
<td>11th October</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>9th October</td>
<td>13th October</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>10th October</td>
<td>16th October</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>10th October</td>
<td>11th October</td>
<td>Syria, Pakistan, Turkey</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>12th October</td>
<td>13th October</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>12th October</td>
<td>15th October</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>16th October</td>
<td>16th October</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>20th October</td>
<td>23rd October</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>24th October</td>
<td>24th October</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>26th October</td>
<td>28th October</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>26th October</td>
<td>27th October</td>
<td>Morocco, Syria</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>28th October</td>
<td>30th October</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>28th October</td>
<td>31th October</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Syria</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>28th October</td>
<td>28th October</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Syria, Turkey</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>29th October</td>
<td>31st October</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>29th October</td>
<td>3rd October</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Pakistan, India</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>30th October</td>
<td>31st October</td>
<td>Egypt, Morocco</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Croatia to Bosnia–Herzegovina**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.1</th>
<th>3rd October</th>
<th>8th October</th>
<th>Afghanistan, Iran</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>7th October</td>
<td>8th October</td>
<td>Iran, Burkina Faso, Burundi</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>10th October</td>
<td>11th October</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>18th October</td>
<td>26th October</td>
<td>Congo, Burundi, Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>30th October</td>
<td>30th October</td>
<td>Iraq, Afghanistan</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BORDER VIOLENCE MONITORING NETWORK

BVMN is a volunteer led endeavor, acting as an alliance of organisations in the Western Balkans and Greece. BVMN is based on the efforts of participant organizations working in the field of documentation, media, advocacy and litigation. We finance the work through charitable grants and foundations, and are not in receipt of funds from any political organisation. The expenditures cover transport subsidies for volunteers in the field and four paid positions.

To follow more from the Border Violence Monitoring Network, check out our website for the entire testimony archive, previous monthly reports and regular news pieces. To follow us on social media, find us on Twitter handle @Border_Violence and on Facebook. For further information regarding this report or more on how to become involved please email us at mail@borderviolence.eu. For press and media requests please contact: press@borderviolence.eu